Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

[Watson Ladd <[e-mail]>]

On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at 5:02 AM, Julien ÉLIE <[e-mail]> wrote:
> Hi Rich,
>
>> It is widely recognized that in many cases, TLS-level compression is
>> flawed (for example NNTP authinfo?).
>
>
> Though I've read a few pages explaining how CRIME and BEAST attacks work, I
> still do not see well how TLS-level compression would make NNTP vulnerable.
> Same thing for POP or IMAP I believe.
>
> The news server does not leak information.  The responses are just OK or KO.
> For instance:

This analysis would predict that HTTP isn't vulnerable. Furthermore,
the whole point is that TLS is supposed to provide certain services to
upper levels, and not require this kind of detailed analysis in
security designs.

>
> AUTHINFO USER test
> 381 Enter password
> AUTHINFO PASS test
> 281 Authentication succeeded
>
> or in the case of an authentication failure:
>
> AUTHINFO USER test
> 381 Enter password
> AUTHINFO PASS badpassword
> 481 Authentication failed
>
>
>
> How compression would make NNTP weaker?
> (Brute-force attack is still necessary, even with compression enabled.)
>
> --
> Julien ÉLIE
>
> « Etna : lave dévalante. »
>
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