Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

[Bill Frantz <[e-mail]>]

On 9/23/15 at 4:17 PM, [e-mail] (Jeffrey Walton) wrote:

>>IMHO, compression adds too many security vulnerabilities to a general
>>purpose secure communication protocol. I think TLS 1.3 is right in
>>eliminating it. It is too big a foot gun.
>
>To play devil's advocate: if (1) compression increases attack surface
>and (2) people use compression, then wouldn't the best place to
>address it be in a protocol or security library rather than pushing it
>into a higher level in the stack where it likely won't be addressed?

Well, it depends. How much security do people need. In the NNTP 
case, I can't see a strong argument for confidentiality. There 
may be a need for compression, which is why I suggested a "TLC" 
(Transport Level Compression) facility, which is, to the extent 
possible, API compatible with a TLS library.


>>I do have a lot of sympathy with those who have been using compression in
>>previous versions of TLS. Probably the best solution for them is to have a
>>TLS like library which only does compression. It could be largely API
>>compatible so switching between TLS and compression is a relatively easy
>>programming job. I'll let the TLS implementers say just how hard such a
>>library would be to produce.
>
>OpenSSL currently has an configuration option to build without
>compression methods (no-comp). I usually build OpenSSL without
>compression, and OWASP recommends building without compression
>(https://www.owasp.org/index.php/C-Based_Toolchain_Hardening).

What we need for NNTP is a build without security, but with 
compression option.

Cheers - Bill

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Bill Frantz        | Ham radio contesting is a    | Periwinkle
[phone]      | contact sport.               | 16345 
Englewood Ave
www.pwpconsult.com |  - Ken Widelitz K6LA / VY2TT | Los Gatos, 
CA 95032