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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 22 September 2015 19:44 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 22:44:41 +0300
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To: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed
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> On Sep 22, 2015, at 9:40 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com> wrote:
> 
> The security community thinks that compression is risky, error-prone, and that a security/auth layer is the wrong place to put it.
> 
> So far, the only counter-argument has been "if TLS 1.2 has a flaw, I want to move to TLS 1.3 without losing data compression."
> 
> Is this accurate?

I think the other counter-argument is that modifying NNTP to have a compression feature is hard, whereas updating the TLS library is something that implementations are likely to do.

I have to wonder if it’s worth it. In the last decade bandwidth has increased and prices for networking have gone down much faster than CPU speeds. 10 years ago having 1 Mbps at home was  the highest-end broadband you could get. Now you routinely get 100x that. CPU has increased, but nowhere near that. This makes compression less desirable, to the point that people did not complain much when browser vendors removed compression following the CRIME attacks. True, the rise of mobile brought back limited bandwidth, but is this really an issue?

Yoav

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