Re: [Uta] WGLC for draft-ietf-uta-rfc6125bis-06

Hi Viktor,

My question was about identity validation, which is what 6125bis is about. So it's a subset of your second option, "validation of certificates". And yes, this boils to, are DANE-based EE certificates expected to adhere to the draft's requirements.

And the reason I raised this question is that the draft defines its own scope with these words:

	This document applies only to service identities that meet these three characteristics: associated with fully-qualified domain names (FQDNs), used with TLS and DTLS, and are PKIX-based. 

I wasn't sure whether "PKIX-based" should be interpreted to include DANE certificates.

Thanks,
	Yaron

On 6/25/22, 21:45, "Uta on behalf of Viktor Dukhovni" <uta-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:

    On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 07:04:28PM +0300, Yaron Sheffer wrote:

    > * Similarly, it is not clear to me whether certs obtained through DANE
    > are in or out of scope.

    I may be able to help, but I am struggling to understand the question in
    sufficient detail.  Can you be more specific about:

        - What do you mean by "certs obtained through DANE" (typically the
          certs are obtained from the TLS server certificate message, and
          matching type Full(0) certificates in the TLSA record are very
          rare)?  Even then, these are semantically not much different from
          those sent in the server certificate message, other than being
          asserted or required trust anchors.

        - Did you perhaps mean *validation* of certificates (received in the
          usual way) via DANE TLSA records?  That is, are DANE-based
          expected to adhere to all the normative text in the draft?

          The main thing that's different about DANE is that in some
          application protocols Unknown Key Share issues are not believed to
          be a concern.  And in these cases EE TLSA records that specify
          only the certificate or public key hash validate a presented
          certificate with a matching public key regardless of lack of
          matching presented identifiers or inception / expiration dates.

          Validation via DANE trust-anchors is the same as validation via
          local WebPKI trust anchors, except that in the case DANE-TA(2) the
          trust-anchor certificate must appear in the server certificate
          chain when the TLSA record provides just a hash of its SPKI (or
          even just the SPKI, which I expect some implementations might not
          support, though this is supported in OpenSSL).

        - Either way, what is it that might then be in or out of scope?

    -- 
        Viktor.

    _______________________________________________
    Uta mailing list
    Uta@ietf.org
    https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/uta