Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00

[Neil Cook <[e-mail]>]

Hi Ted,

Thanks, I guess I misunderstood what you were trying to say regarding the draft,

Neil

> On 17 Jul 2019, at 16:57, Ted Hardie <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Hi Neil,
> 
> I am sorry if I was not clear,  The point of the draft is to enable the network operator to signal this:
>    If the user agent can check for the presence of a policy, this could be
>    used as a signal that the network operator wishes its resolver to be
>    used as a condition of using the network, and that DoH or DoT should
>    be disabled.
> That permits your guests to know of your network policy and to abide by it if they choose; presumably you would not provide network access if they chose not to. 
> 
> regards,
> 
> Ted Hardie
> 
> Neil
> 
>> On 17 Jul 2019, at 16:25, Ted Hardie <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Vittorio,
>> 
>> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 1:06 AM Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola=[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> 
>>> Il 17 luglio 2019 07:01 Rob Sayre <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> ha scritto:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 12:30 PM Jim Reid < [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote: 
>>> 
>>> Whether or not these tools/services work well is another issue entirely. And IMO not something to discuss at the IETF. 
>>> 
>>> Hi Jim, 
>>> 
>>> I thought about this email a lot today. 
>>> 
>>> I think the problem with its sentiment is that whether or not tools/services work on the Internet might be fairly called "engineering", and this is the Internet Engineering Task Force, right?
>> But if you have tools that work well enough that millions of people rely on them and that they are encouraged or even mandated in many countries, and you decide to develop and implement technologies to prevent them from working
>> 
>> The IETF builds building blocks that meet specific needs.  In building DNS over TLS, DNS over DTLS, and DNS over HTTPS, it was adding the protocol functionality to make DNS queries confidential from inspection by network observers.  The energy for that work was the reaction to pervasive surveillance, but it is clear that other attackers had been gathering data for some time.  The IETF was not building these protocols to stop the use of the DNS as a policy enforcement mechanism and it is entirely possible to integrate them into a system which does this by offering the policy enforcing resolver over one of these confidential protocols.  
>> 
>> But, and this is the crux of the matter, that integration requires the cooperation of the endpoint or its control by an organization's system administrators.  If you do not have their cooperation or the right to manage them by tools like those Eric mentions, it is difficult for the endpoint to distinguish a network-level interception by a mandated policy engine and by an attacker.  
>> 
>> Rather than falling back to the state where the endpoint simple accepts that its traffic is visible to all and possibly intercepted, this new work is an effort to make it easier for you to gain the cooperation required.  I hope you can see that this is in both the interest of policy enforcement bodies and the end users.
>> 
>> best regards,
>> 
>> Ted
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
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> 
> Neil Cook
> [e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]>
> 
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Neil Cook
[e-mail]

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