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Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 16 July 2019 20:23 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2019 13:22:53 -0700
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To: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Cc: Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>, add@ietf.org, "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon@sky.uk>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00
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On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 1:17 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 1:11 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>> In fairness, I'm not sure I quite follow. But, if I worked at a browser
>>> vendor, I would be worried about DoH rollout too. I think I'd gradually
>>> ratchet up the security signals in the location bar with the end result of
>>> marking sites insecure if their IP was fetched over DNS in the clear.
>>>
>>
>> Ignoring the UI question, let me push a bit on "in the clear".
>>
>
> Sure, but I don't you should ignore the UI question. Having been on the
> receiving end of a few "why is the lock broken on our site?" emails from a
> CEO, I can tell you it is really effective.
>
>
>>
>> Currently, resolvers are configured by IP address, not domain name.
>>
>
> This is true, so companies go for stuff like 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8.
>

Right, but if you're getting that out of DHCP, that doesn't help, because
you can't trust that.


>
>> So absent mechanisms such as TRR, how does the DNS client form a secure
>> connection to the resolver? What domain name is in the certificate and how
>> does the client learn that domain name?
>>
>
> I agree that there's a bootstrapping problem, but I don't think this draft
> helps with that.
>

I'm not saying it does. I'm just trying to work through the entire problem.
What I'm arguing here is that absent external configuration (e.g.,
DoH/TRR), there's no real way to get encrypted DNS that is secure against
active attack.

-Ekr



> thanks,
> Rob
>
>
>
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> This is distinct from choosing a DNS vendor.
>>>
>>> thanks,
>>> Rob
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>

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