Re: [Add] draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00

Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com> Mon, 15 July 2019 13:55 UTC

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From: Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 14:54:36 +0100
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To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00
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On Mon, 15 Jul 2019 at 11:27, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola=
40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Also, often that policy enforcement is actually being done on behalf of
> the user to increase his/her security, so even if we only wanted to focus
> on maximizing security, the choice would be between connecting securely to
> a (from the user's point of view) less secure resolver, and connecting
> insecurely to a more secure resolver; which option of the two is in the end
> more secure depends on the specific case (threat scenarios and their
> likelihood), so I think each application will make its own choice, often
> asking the user. Of course the proper solution is to have a way for the
> users to connect securely to the more secure resolver, but in the meantime
> both options should be made available.
>

Hi Vittorio!

May I please observe for everyone that one of the quirks which will
complicate discussion of this proposal, is overloading of the word "secure"
in descriptions like this?

I am presuming that most people here have worked with some kind of "threat
modelling", but the high-level challenge here is that the word "secure"
(and "more/less secure") is abstract and not descriptive of "why" someone
might want to use one resolver over another; or why the environment
surrounding that user may wish to impose a different resolver upon them.

Hence something like:

*Also, often that policy enforcement is actually being done on behalf of
the user to increase his/her {PRIVACY, INTEGRITY}, so even if we only
wanted to focus on maximizing {PRIVACY, INTEGRITY}, the choice would be
between connecting {PRIVATELY, TAMPERPROOFLY, ASSUREDLY} to a (from the
user's point of view) less {PRIVATE, TRUSTWORTHY, TAMPERPROOF} resolver,
and connecting {WITH WEAK PRIVACY, ASSURANCE, TRUST} to a more {PRIVATE,
TRUSTWORTHY} resolver; which option of the two is in the end more
{PRIVATELY, TAMPERPROOF} depends on the specific case (threat scenarios and
their likelihood), so I think each application will make its own choice,
often asking the user. Of course the proper solution is to have a way for
the users to connect {PRIVATELY, TAMPERPROOFLY} to the more {PRIVATE,
TRUSTWORTHY} resolver, but in the meantime both options should be made
available.*


...delete as applicable? :-)

tl;dr - the "S" word does not mean anything without further explanation.

     - alec

-- 
http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm