Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00

tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> Wed, 17 July 2019 14:05 UTC

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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jul 2019 19:35:24 +0530
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>, ADD Mailing list <add@ietf.org>, "Dixon, Hugh" <Hugh.Dixon@sky.uk>, Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Add] [EXTERNAL] Re: draft-grover-add-policy-detection-00
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On Wed, 17 Jul 2019 at 01:41, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 1:02 PM Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 12:53 PM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Taking a TRR-style system out of the equation for a moment. Suppose that
>>> what I want is for all devices on my network to use a filtering resolver. I
>>> don't expect any evasion because they're all my devices, it's just a matter
>>> of convenience to centrally configure it. So what I do here is I configure
>>> my DHCP server to provide the IP address of that resolver. Now, those
>>> devices do unencrypted DNS because that's what everyone does. Now, suppose
>>> that resolver starts offering DoT. How do my devices learn that
>>> information? The resolver could tell them over DNS but then we have a
>>> straightforward downgrade attack from anyone on the network. Do you agree
>>> with this so far? Do you have a proposed solution?
>>>
>>
>> In fairness, I'm not sure I quite follow. But, if I worked at a browser
>> vendor, I would be worried about DoH rollout too. I think I'd gradually
>> ratchet up the security signals in the location bar with the end result of
>> marking sites insecure if their IP was fetched over DNS in the clear.
>>
>
> Ignoring the UI question, let me push a bit on "in the clear".
>
> Currently, resolvers are configured by IP address, not domain name. So
> absent mechanisms such as TRR, how does the DNS client form a secure
> connection to the resolver? What domain name is in the certificate and how
> does the client learn that domain name?
>

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dprive-bootstrap-dns-server-04
discusses
mechanism to automatically bootstrap endpoints to discover and authenticate
DoT/DoH servers provided by a local network. The client securely learns the
domain name and DNS server certificate.

Cheers,
-Tiru


>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>
>> This is distinct from choosing a DNS vendor.
>>
>> thanks,
>> Rob
>>
>>
>>
>> --
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