Re: [Add] Mozilla's DoH resolver policy

[Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>]

On 4/16/2019 11:25 AM, Adam Roach wrote:
> On 4/16/19 10:08 AM, Livingood, Jason wrote:
>> But if TRR-to-auth recursion is not available via DoT, I wonder what
>> the recommended mechanism is for providing a more privacy-protective
>> network-geographic hint to an authoritative server, in order for
>> example for a CDN to dynamically respond with a localized response.
>> Maybe something new needs to be standardized? What options do folks
>> suggest?
>
>
> I realize that the kind of change I'm pointing to here would represent
> a significant shift in deployment models, but perhaps some
> out-of-the-box thinking would be useful. The results reported in
> <https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog37/presentations/matt.levine.pdf>
> are very encouraging. 


On a related note, the IETF version of QUIC is including an option to
automatically migrate a client's QUIC connection to a "server preferred
address". This is specifically designed so the initial handshake can
happen through a server anycast address, but the reminder of the
connection goes through a server unicast address specific to the server
site. I short, it will work as long as anycast routing remains stable
for 1 RTT or 2.

-- Christian Huitema