Re: [Add] ECS privacy concerns, alternatives?

"Mark Delany" <h4m@mike.emu.st> Tue, 16 April 2019 23:10 UTC

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From: Mark Delany <h4m@mike.emu.st>
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Subject: Re: [Add] ECS privacy concerns, alternatives?
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On 16Apr19, Brian Dickson allegedly wrote:

> That's why I indicated that by "geo", I meant OPTIONALLY more fine-grained
> than country-level:
> 
> >country and sub-country levels, e.g. ISO-3166, with 3166-1 being
> countries, and 3166-2 being sub-country 3-letter codes.

I hope I'm not mis-understanding you, but no level of fine-grained GEO
provides suitable input for topology-based solvers. I want to know
which networks you are connected to and even a high-precision lat/long
doesn't tell me that. Your /24 does.

> I'm pretty sure we are not in a one-size-fits-all world here.

For sure, but fine-grained GEO raises more questions. What if you want
to send sub-country codes to trusted auths to get better resolution
but only country codes to less trusted auths to get better
privacy. How is that provisioned in end-user equipment and kept
current?


The other thing is that auths can play discovery tricks to correlate
queries with client IPs anyway. E.g. issue nonce IPs with very short
TTLs then watch for inbound connections. (Finally a killer app for
IPv6!). So I think we want to be crystal clear about what privacy risk
we think is being solved and whether it's lulling people into a false
sense of security or not.


Mark.