Re: [Add] Mozilla's DoH resolver policy

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Tue, 16 April 2019 18:25 UTC

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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Tue, 16 Apr 2019 13:25:31 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Add] Mozilla's DoH resolver policy
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On 4/16/19 10:08 AM, Livingood, Jason wrote:
> But if TRR-to-auth recursion is not available via DoT, I wonder what the recommended mechanism is for providing a more privacy-protective network-geographic hint to an authoritative server, in order for example for a CDN to dynamically respond with a localized response. Maybe something new needs to be standardized? What options do folks suggest?


I realize that the kind of change I'm pointing to here would represent a 
significant shift in deployment models, but perhaps some out-of-the-box 
thinking would be useful. The results reported in 
<https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog37/presentations/matt.levine.pdf> 
are very encouraging.

/a