Re: [Add] Mozilla's DoH resolver policy

"Ralf Weber" <dns@fl1ger.de> Thu, 11 April 2019 08:59 UTC

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From: Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>
Cc: add@ietf.org
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2019 10:59:35 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Add] Mozilla's DoH resolver policy
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Moin!

On 11 Apr 2019, at 5:12, Martin Thomson wrote:
> We don't believe that DNSSEC is essential to our primary goals, which 
> are improving privacy of browsing activity.  As a browser, we can't 
> condition our behaviour on whether DNSSEC was present and valid for a 
> variety of reasons (some of which we might discuss separately), but we 
> do value resolvers that perform DNSSEC validation.
So why not make DNSSEC validation in the resolver a requirement? It 
doesn’t interfere with local policy and offers significant benefits 
for the user. Validation in the client would be nicer, but requiring it 
in the resolver is a good first step.

So long
-Ralf
—--
Ralf Weber