Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter

[Adrian Farrel <[e-mail]>]

Ted, you beat me to it.

 

Yes, the whole point of “exposure” is not that it is being wilfully displayed, but that an attacker (who finds a way of viewing or copying traffic) can see every non-encrypted field every packet (on a link or at a node).

 

While enterprise networks may consider themselves better protected than service provider networks (where the links are in public spaces), it turns out that enterprises are similarly vulnerable, partly because their traffic may be more valuable.

 

A

 

From: Ted Hardie <[e-mail]> 
Sent: 20 January 2023 08:54
To: Donald Eastlake <[e-mail]>
Cc: [e-mail]; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter

 

Hi Donald,

 

On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 6:05 AM Donald Eastlake <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> > wrote:


The use of the APNET Field inside an APNET network domain would not
generally expose it to "outside observers" unless all the traffic in
the domain was so exposed 

 

I agree with the statement above and disagree with the statement below.  I think you're entirely right to say that the field would only be exposed if the network traffic were generally exposed.  On the other hand, the lesson of pervasive surveillance is and was that the amount of traffic being hoovered up is always more than you think.  Presuming it will be available to an attacker is a far safer assumption than assuming that this is rare.  Certainly I would expect the security considerations to presume that such attackers were within the threat model.

 

regards,

 

Ted Hardie

 

 

 

which I think is something that would rarely
happen rather than "necessarily" happen. But some more could be said
about privacy and security