IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter

Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 20 January 2023 08:55 UTC

Return-Path: <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: apn@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: apn@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA8D5C14CEFE for <apn@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:55:14 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -7.097
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.097 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id x8sw6cthybag for <apn@ietfa.amsl.com>; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:55:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ed1-x52c.google.com (mail-ed1-x52c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52c]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B68DDC14F74F for <apn@ietf.org>; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:54:19 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ed1-x52c.google.com with SMTP id w14so5927183edi.5 for <apn@ietf.org>; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:54:19 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=RkVDtLRoebsVVD8s+xrcYkN0/lu+0VmgiBshkv2Uzzw=; b=k2slf11bc0z4QjJ0HbdDA7rG0jn0ySgIz2lXJyd1ljgonMoTserqwoxO/T7TyIL5JR e7VYByABFMQXK6+D+fEw8yBIchSiWEaIcKdpoW7BZijgpsfBeTiVBH/a/tap3BXaoKt8 fO8GOMq7Y4l1JLALU/NmuNwfgDdQn0gBsSNyIGG6eOVhZ99dAsH8pvZT/mkhryKTn7cS PlIts3GXqFWLqzdVlgSIuksgeC1lYOgox2p47HI+TguXnaSK8u50xSnd89Zw3vfBIRlU 2Dj4YpUNBUldi7HhHfkOYUoS64/ESoMPovfZZyF7MYMEnArIO+Dq1WjkwHaPtNl0WSl3 Uq4w==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=RkVDtLRoebsVVD8s+xrcYkN0/lu+0VmgiBshkv2Uzzw=; b=PfpIo/36rKgnPVNuLB6ZkoDBWyJ85e92yuaItRU4iYd5pQASUInfFuQ/HOQnrwahbP OhjK/yjG2Y81ulqhHHabcH+QJOyHEY5tsF2R8/XVh3be/swYTepORohmWxwSaU8uaRrm AitO9E0Qa8hV6KOR0KhlnMO7nLvfT6Sdv7BSy61vO89mGpF/QSBOnF6x956br+79ilyx 53TPyZRziz5ZQxOzzXbyVJXXYrRhQVUsgdCKHnIEJ+czeL5fSO4oxwJjRd/i1lQXRRbL K0IaJ7pgZfdIdoT6CwRqCWhvdsJ3j8vjbHl5PuS2CZqZwk5bfCoZhe/eaBWXY+00Zqex 1D6A==
X-Gm-Message-State: AFqh2kqzygI8t0kiF+HZakU6TeWX88h/pWWHgBwMI1VbScVO4QFUM2Tj pnIllN+6yX3tDTDsc4GLyf0/VNg/6DcsdXM5o6jsJOkbMxI=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AMrXdXtxjKjRMpLmdGFm22r1lMRDR15LYvfkrf94aItSOpW2Dpw/8XCExj7e5A1dQVW0PaH1tJBMM5ovD99PkLR+9DU=
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:35c1:b0:483:212f:1982 with SMTP id z1-20020a05640235c100b00483212f1982mr1848303edc.199.1674204858081; Fri, 20 Jan 2023 00:54:18 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAF4+nEFHcKBbc7J8v3yj_b6V1==4yUBOOhdazR2yrP75Gcd0mA@mail.gmail.com> <051d01d92b82$73cda4a0$5b68ede0$@olddog.co.uk> <CAF4+nEGj_94YoG330zb5-p6BGaJ5Cce3tuiVDt-eo7E6NaCU5w@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAF4+nEGj_94YoG330zb5-p6BGaJ5Cce3tuiVDt-eo7E6NaCU5w@mail.gmail.com>
From: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 08:53:51 +0000
Message-ID: <CA+9kkMAQcjd4Xckd9wiQiyUCQe0FxwHaOiZ5efZDHmWvYpThoQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
Cc: adrian@olddog.co.uk, apn@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000d8e62a05f2ae31fe"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/apn/ZD0WQM2RoDIeiVYG-4keA96YeYQ>
Subject: Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter
X-BeenThere: apn@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: Application-aware Networking <apn.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/apn>, <mailto:apn-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/apn/>
List-Post: <mailto:apn@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:apn-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/apn>, <mailto:apn-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 08:55:15 -0000

Hi Donald,

On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 6:05 AM Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> The use of the APNET Field inside an APNET network domain would not
> generally expose it to "outside observers" unless all the traffic in
> the domain was so exposed


I agree with the statement above and disagree with the statement below.  I
think you're entirely right to say that the field would only be exposed if
the network traffic were generally exposed.  On the other hand, the lesson
of pervasive surveillance is and was that the amount of traffic being
hoovered up is always more than you think.  Presuming it will be available
to an attacker is a far safer assumption than assuming that this is rare.
Certainly I would expect the security considerations to presume that such
attackers were within the threat model.

regards,

Ted Hardie



which I think is something that would rarely
> happen rather than "necessarily" happen. But some more could be said
> about privacy and security
>
>
>

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email