Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter

[Andrew Alston - IETF <[e-mail]>]

Speaking with no hats on here – I did feel like I need to respond to this.

Let me say – with 100% categoric certainty – there are parts of the world – where pervasive and intrusive surveillance is very very real – at a national level – where every service providers links are passed through hardware under the control of the state and where traffic is examined – monitored – manipulated – and the consequences can be dire – where in some cases – to be blunt – people end up in jail or worse for expressing views at the wrong times (read elections).

This is not in any way shape or form limited to one or two countries either – it is far more common than a lot of people would be willing to admit – I know this – because I’ve seen it firsthand – in a multitude of countries in the region in which I operate.  Do not for a moment think that because such surveillance doesn’t happen in some parts of the world – that it isn’t extremely pervasive in other parts.  For me personally – security and privacy are mandatory.  There are those that would argue that – if it doesn’t really leave the domain it doesn’t matter – but that’s simply not true.  The fact is that when you layer crypto on packets, analyzing them requires context, and anything outside of the layer of encryption that can be used to identify applications people and other such things, adds to that context.  Leaving the domain isn’t necessary when the taps and the surveillance exists inside the domains, and in many places in the world, it does and its real.

When it comes to security and privacy, I believe that the operator has the responsibility, to the best of their ability, to protection from such surveillance.  Now, keeping in mind that a provider cannot refuse certain requests, that leaves the option of not deploying anything that could potentially give further ways to analyze and give context to traffic flows to the detriment of users.  So yes, the security and privacy concerns are real – and they have to be addressed, properly.

Andrew


From: Apn <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Donald Eastlake
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2023 8:05 PM
To: [e-mail]
Cc: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter

Certainly there is privacy and security work to be done. What I
objected to is what appeared to me to be an assertion that every
provider and enterprise network link is always being surveilled by
possibly malign outside observers. But that happens sometimes which is
another reason for taking into account privacy and security concerns.

Thanks,
Donald
===============================
Donald E. Eastlake 3rd [phone] (cell)
2386 Panoramic Circle, Apopka, FL 32703 USA
[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>

On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 5:41 AM Adrian Farrel <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>
> Ted, you beat me to it.
>
>
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> Yes, the whole point of “exposure” is not that it is being wilfully displayed, but that an attacker (who finds a way of viewing or copying traffic) can see every non-encrypted field every packet (on a link or at a node).
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> While enterprise networks may consider themselves better protected than service provider networks (where the links are in public spaces), it turns out that enterprises are similarly vulnerable, partly because their traffic may be more valuable.
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> A
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> From: Ted Hardie <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
> Sent: 20 January 2023 08:54
> To: Donald Eastlake <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
> Cc: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
> Subject: Re: [Apn] Further revised draft Charter
>
>
>
> Hi Donald,
>
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> On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 6:05 AM Donald Eastlake <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
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> The use of the APNET Field inside an APNET network domain would not
> generally expose it to "outside observers" unless all the traffic in
> the domain was so exposed
>
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>
> I agree with the statement above and disagree with the statement below. I think you're entirely right to say that the field would only be exposed if the network traffic were generally exposed. On the other hand, the lesson of pervasive surveillance is and was that the amount of traffic being hoovered up is always more than you think. Presuming it will be available to an attacker is a far safer assumption than assuming that this is rare. Certainly I would expect the security considerations to presume that such attackers were within the threat model.
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> regards,
>
>
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> Ted Hardie
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> which I think is something that would rarely
> happen rather than "necessarily" happen. But some more could be said
> about privacy and security
>

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