Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records
Vernon Schryver <vjs@calcite.rhyolite.com> Wed, 05 March 2003 00:09 UTC
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From: Vernon Schryver <vjs@calcite.rhyolite.com>
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To: Asrg@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records
References: <20030304233418.GA17958@danisch.de>
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Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2003 17:08:59 -0700
> Received: from sklave3.rackland.de (sklave3.rackland.de [213.133.101.23]) > by calcite.rhyolite.com (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id h24NZ8im005746 > (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA bits=168 verify=FAIL) > for <vjs@calcite.rhyolite.com> env-from <hadmut@danisch.de>; > Tue, 4 Mar 2003 16:35:10 -0700 (MST) > Received: from sodom (uucp@localhost) > by sklave3.rackland.de (8.12.8/8.12.8/Debian-1) with BSMTP id h24NZ7i3024946; > Wed, 5 Mar 2003 00:35:07 +0100 > Received: from sodom.home.danisch.de (localhost [127.0.0.1]) > by sodom.home.danisch.de (8.12.8/8.12.8/Debian-1) with ESMTP id h24NYIuB018298 > (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); > Wed, 5 Mar 2003 00:34:18 +0100 > Received: (from hadmut@localhost) > by sodom.home.danisch.de (8.12.8/8.12.8/Debian-1) id h24NYI2q018296; > Wed, 5 Mar 2003 00:34:18 +0100 > From: Hadmut Danisch <hadmut@danisch.de> > ... > Insecurity and forgeability have never ever been a design goal > of SMTP. That's a disadvantage, but not a design goal. That is wrong if asked and answered honestly. Of course "insecurity" and "forgeability" have not been design goals, but "receiving mail from strangers" has been a goal. Authentication is not magic pixie dust that can be sprinkled over a protocol. Authenticating strangers is nonsense. A stranger is someone you don't know, including don't know he is not a bank robber, spammer, your long lost uncle, or all three. Contrary to your implicit claim, sending from one IP address with a different return IP address has always been a design goal. Sending from one domain name with a return address in another domain has always been an explicit design goal at least as far as the Reply-To header is concerned. That the Sender header exists, suggests that differing SMTP client reverse DNS domaon name and Mail_From values has been a goal. For at least 15 years allowing such mismatches have been a practical requirement. Requiring that the reverse DNS domain name matches the Mail_From domain name is as wrong aad silly as it would be to requirer that when you send a picture postcard while on vacation you use your current hotel as your return address. Neither requirement would reduce fraud, spam, or anything else that is bad. There are reasons why large ISPs would like to impose such a requirement. The instant messaging battle between AOL and Microsoft demonstrates why they would like it and why reasonable people oppose it. Whether sklave3.rackland.de authenticates mail from sodom.home.danisch.de with a Mail_from value of hadmut@danisch.de tells no one outside whether you are a spammer. On the other hand, if you were a spammer, it would be trivial to finger you by contacting the operators of 213.133.101.23 or if necessary 213.133.96.29, 213.133.96.65, or 212.114.147.1. Since both sklave3.rackland.de and calcite.rhyolite.com are running SMTP-TLS, your mail could have been authenticated, if only my system had a certificate. But that certificate would not tell me or my system anything that I don't already know or would need to know about whether your mail is spam. If mail.rackland.de also runs SMTP-TLS and if you check its logs, you will probably find that some spammers are also using SMTP-TLS. > That's a disadvantage, but not a design goal. That authentication is nonsense when receiving mail from strangers is an unavoidable disadvantage of the design goal of receiving mail from strangers. > It has also > never been a design goal of telnet to make plaintext passwords > available to eavesdroppers. That's irrelevant noise. > We cannot fix any security hole as long as we insist on still > fulfilling a so called "design goal" which states insecurity. Stated honestly, that is true. Indeed, we cannot fix security holes that are implicit in the design goals without changing the design goals. If your design goals imply a protocol that authenticates senders, then use SMTP-AUTH, STMP-TLS, SMIME, PGP, or others. They are all widely available and work fine. However, they are also useless and irrelevant for a general mail protocol among strangers. > Keep in mind the SMTP as we know it was designed more than 20 years > ago (Jon Postels RFC 821 dates from August 1982). In 1982 and before, > there were almost no security considerations in context of internet > protocols, especially for e-mail. The security business developed in > the 90's. Plain SMTP is one of the last dinosaurs of the pre-security > era still alive. > > Security didn't play any role in the design of SMTP. Even if it did, > after more than 20 years of progress in internet protocols and > security, such an age-old design goal would require some revision. > > So that so called "design goal" is neither existing nor really relevant. That is various quite wrong and entirely irrelevant. Vernon Schryver vjs@rhyolite.com _______________________________________________ Asrg mailing list Asrg@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/asrg
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Derek J. Balling
- [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Daniel Feenberg
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Hadmut Danisch
- Re: [Asrg] domain specific DNS blacklists (or whi… wayne
- Re: [Asrg] domain specific DNS blacklists (or whi… Roland
- [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Adam Back
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Hadmut Danisch
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Roland
- DNS is broken, and by extension so is RMX (Re: [A… Adam Back
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Adam Back
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Hadmut Danisch
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Vernon Schryver
- RE: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Gary Feldman
- [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Peter A. Friend
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Vernon Schryver
- RE: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Hadmut Danisch
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Derek J. Balling
- RE: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Gary Feldman
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Dr. Jeffrey Race
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Alan DeKok
- False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records) David F. Skoll
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Kee Hinckley
- RE: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Troy Rollo
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Derek J. Balling
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Vernon Schryver
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Troy Rollo
- RE: [Asrg] Re: RMX and DS Records Gordon Fecyk - Home
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Hadmut Danisch
- Fwd: Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Dr. Jeffrey Race
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… David F. Skoll
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Matt Sergeant
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… David F. Skoll
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Matt Sergeant
- Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Records Chris Lewis
- Re: [Asrg] Good versus bad (was Re: RMX Records ) Alan DeKok
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Alan DeKok
- [Asrg] Re: False Positives Peter A. Friend
- Re: [Asrg] Good versus bad (was Re: RMX Records ) Chris Lewis
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… David F. Skoll
- Re: [Asrg] Good versus bad (was Re: RMX Records ) David F. Skoll
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Terry Carmen
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… David F. Skoll
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Chris Lewis
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Eric S. Johansson
- Re: [Asrg] Good versus bad (was Re: RMX Records ) Chris Lewis
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Chris Lewis
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Kee Hinckley
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… abuse
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Kee Hinckley
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… abuse
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… abuse
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Eric S. Johansson
- Re: False positives (was Re: [Asrg] Re: RMX Recor… Wilson Roberto Afonso