Re: [dmarc-ietf] Signaling MLMs

Benny Pedersen <me@junc.eu> Wed, 19 April 2023 13:51 UTC

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Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2023 15:50:54 +0200
From: Benny Pedersen <me@junc.eu>
To: dmarc@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Signaling MLMs
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Alessandro Vesely skrev den 2023-04-19 11:09:

>>> Benny is telling the world “ietf.org [1] is authorize to resign on my 
>>> behalf” via DNS.  No headers required.  No delayed learning 
>>> necessary.
> How would I get a clue of that?

reading books ?

>> if all maillist did arc on incomming mails before mailman scrapled 
>> dkim then all will be good, only left is dmarc is not in all places 
>> tests arc results
> It is all too easy to spoof an ARC chain offering false authentication
> results.

ARC chains is untrusted by defaullt, where is the problem ?

> Allowing ARC to override DMARC result requires the ARC
> signer to be whitelisted.

whitelisted is not right word for it, its either trusted or untrusted

> Now, one can object that whitelisting could be done by DKIM, by SPF,
> by DNSWL, without the need to introduce a new, long-winded protocol.
> However, ARC brings a couple of advantages:
> 
> 1) In case of multiple forwarding steps, ARC delivers an ordered and
> cohesive chain which is easier to verify than a messy mass of DKIM
> signatures.

recipients should only care of dmarc, not dkim/arc/spf fails

to make this work dmarc must trust arc

> 2) Authentication results, which normally are deleted or renamed on
> crossing ADMD barriers, can be exported.

well it scramples dkim, no go

> As they can sometimes be
> checked against message transformation, fraudsters can in the long run
> be debunked.

if we keep the problem on maillist we lost all the goods dkim protect, i 
dont want this

i still wonder what errors done in rspamd now :/

my dmarc policy is none, but rspamd says its reject, hmm