Re: [dns-privacy] WGLC : draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing

Florian Obser <florian+ietf@narrans.de> Wed, 29 March 2023 09:27 UTC

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From: Florian Obser <florian+ietf@narrans.de>
To: dns-privacy@ietf.org
References: <64e17d73-ea1a-00cb-a8a5-b5cfb39c37ae@innovationslab.net> <00209F39-7B17-483E-AFFF-69084F3FF105@fl1ger.de> <ZCP9XjjMJn/PUm9P@laperouse.bortzmeyer.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2023 18:27:40 +0900
In-Reply-To: <ZCP9XjjMJn/PUm9P@laperouse.bortzmeyer.org> (Stephane Bortzmeyer's message of "Wed, 29 Mar 2023 17:57:02 +0900")
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] WGLC : draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing
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On 2023-03-29 17:57 +09, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2023 at 09:29:46PM +0900,
>  Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de> wrote 
>  a message of 30 lines which said:
>
>> As I don’t think probing for secure transport is a good idea and
>> hope that we will come up with better solutions that follows the DNS
>> delegation model.
>
> You mean the parent announcing the zone has ADoT servers? This seems a
> good way to have discrepancies between the announce and the reality.
>
>> While I think using IP addresses for authoritative server selection
>> is a natural choice there have been cases where an authoritative
>> server on the same IP answers differently deepening on the domain
>> asked, which will not work well with the detailed implementation of
>> that draft.
>
> The point is that this draft is an opportunity to state clearly what
> we expect from the authoritative name servers. Requesting that all
> instances at the same IP address have DoT does not seem unreasonable
> but, indeed, it is not written anywhere yet.

One other issue that occurred to me, and again, no commentary if this is
a good idea or not, but I do know that people do this: If a resolver
sends probe-traffic to port 853 just because there is a nameserver
running on the same IP, might trip up thread-intelligence systems
and block the resolver IP.

-- 
In my defence, I have been left unsupervised.