RE: Last Call: draft-irtf-asrg-dnsbl (DNS Blacklists and Whitelists)

<michael.dillon@bt.com> Tue, 11 November 2008 14:54 UTC

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Subject: RE: Last Call: draft-irtf-asrg-dnsbl (DNS Blacklists and Whitelists)
Date: Tue, 11 Nov 2008 14:53:50 -0000
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From: michael.dillon@bt.com
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> there's a lot of evil e-mail messages out there; the cost of 
> letting even one of those messages through is unacceptable, 
> so false positives are OK. 

This is precisely the sort of thing that should have been 
covered in much more detail in the Security Considerations
section of the draft.

> I have no problem with the IETF documenting the world as it exists.
> That's what an informational track RFC does.  

> (where, "oh well, we'll just block the whole /48 or /32" 
> might have unfortunate side effects not forseen yet)

Again, this is missing from the Security Considerations.

--Michael Dillon
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