Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet

[Mounira MSAHLI <[e-mail]>]

Dear all, Dear Russ, Dear Jerome, Dear Alex,



I’m sorry for the delay. I would like to provide some clarifications
concerning:



>> This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I participated, and

some about I heard of, people use normal PKI with openssl and normal

certificates in cars, over IP, on cellular links like 4G.  They work

fine.


But, I want to highlight that the European commission are  funding several
Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) deployment projects such as:


- Scoop@F http://www.scoop.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/ :


which is about deploying 3000 cars + 2000 km of roads


- InterCor https://intercor-project.eu/,

- C-Roads Platform https://www.c-roads.eu/platform.html


InterCor and C-Roads are about harmonising C-ITS specifications in Europe


- INDID
https://www.c-roads.eu/pilots/core-members/france/Partner/project/show/indid.html
.


All these projects are using ETSI TS 103 097 certificates, which is a
profile of 1609.2 to secure C-ITS messages:

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf


As mentioned by Jerome, one use case of the RFC 8902 could be to sign CAM
and DENM messages on facilities layer and not geonet as specified in ETSI.
Yes, in projects dealing with C-ITS security interoperability, we use MQTT
to exchange C-ITS messages between many countries to ensure continuity
of service
when vehicle is crossing borders.


We could also use the RFC for Vehicle-To-Internet simply to upload log of
vehicle for example etc…



>> The reason is because the former is all open source software and freely
accessible standards, whereas  1609.2 are closed documents and ETSI ITS
certificate software is not integrated in mainline software like openssl.


There's a java implementation of 1609.2/103 097 here:
https://github.com/pvendil/c2c-common. I already used it.


>> ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the certificate are

expensive.  hard to access and the certificate are expensive.


you can get certificates from https://www.ghsiss.com/v2x-certificates/



>> In  my personal opinion, it remains good if IPWAVE provides a guideline
on how to secure IP vehicular communication, including interoperability
between systems (although I have at that time limited resources to actively
contribute to this), as several options are on the table and we need to
guarantee the trust chain, even considering different protocol or standards
being used.


I’m also interested to work on security interoperability in C-ITS and we
could add:


- Misbehaving in vehicular network

- Revocation management

- Pseudonym management/change to avoid tracking and to ensure privacy


Thank you Russ for your time on this RFC and for your valuable review.



Kind regards

Mounira






>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
> De : Alexandre Petrescu <[e-mail]>
> Date: jeu. 15 avr. 2021 à 22:44
> Subject: Re: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL,
> and the one PKI and one Internet
> To: Jérôme Härri <[e-mail]>, IPWAVE WG <[e-mail]>
>
>
>
>
> Le 15/04/2021 à 12:35, Jérôme Härri a écrit :
> > Dear Alex,
> >
> > Thanks. Indeed such discrepancies is particularly an issue when it
> > comes to merging wireless and wired (V2I). For example, you send a
> > DENM over 5G reaching a MEC. It will remove the ETSI KPI and do
> > something on its own (not fully sure what exactly), or if you use
> > MQTT type of interaction, where it is even less clear (what a broker
> > will do on a DENM sent over JSON is not fully clear to keep track of
> > any kind of security/data integrity...
> >
> > For that matter, there was one effort from C-ROAD to develop
> > something called 'Facilities' PKI, saying that the ITS KPI are at
> > facilities layer and no longer at geonet. The advantage is that at
> > least now, you do not need to remove the KPI when moving and
> > exchanging DENM (or else) in backend. But I am not sure of the
> > current status or even if this WI is actually active.
> >
> > Now, I do not fully agree with you with the equivalence of the
> > internet KPI and ITS KPI. Indeed, the principle is the same, but in
> > the test you mention, the trust chain is not guaranteed (you edit
> > your own root-CA for the purpose of the tests, but for example in one
> > of our cross-border deployment (e.g. DE-FR), this solution does not
> > work, as a German car will not recognize the CA from a French
> > root-CA. So, the key issue I see is not really (or only) on security
> > but on Trust. The ITS KPI is one option, there might be others, but
> > 'open ssl' strategies still face the trust-chain issue.
>
> Jérôme,
>
> I agree with you.
>
> In the discussion above I think you meant 'PKI' throughout (Public Key
> Infrastructure), and not 'KPI' (Key Performance Indicator).
>
> That said, the question you formulate about how a car-to-server MQTT
> interaction on IP would be authenticated by certificates that are
> verified by CAs that are absent from normal browsers, or how the CAs
> that are present in normal browsers would help authenticating CAM
> messages sent on IP - is a very relevant question.
>
> Alex
> >
> > Best Regards,
> >
> > Jérôme
> >
> > -----Original Message----- From: its <[e-mail]> On Behalf
> > Of Alexandre Petrescu Sent: Thursday, 15 April 2021 12:20 To: IPWAVE
> > WG <[e-mail]> Subject: [ipwave] RFC8902 - TLS with ITS
> > Certificates, EXPERIMENTAL, and the one PKI and one Internet
> >
> > Hi, IPWAVErs,
> >
> > A colleague pointed me to this recently issued RFC 8902 about TLS
> > with ITS Certificates.
> >
> > This RFC is of an EXPERIMENTAL Category.
> >
> > It might be in agreement with other IEEE standards such as 1609.2.
> >
> > But I must say that I think it further deepens the discrepancy
> > between what is PKI in the Internet and what is the closed PKI for
> > ITS.  That is a discrepancy that exists for a long time, and I must
> > share that - IMHO - I am surprised that the IETF issues an RFC that
> > further promotes such a discrepancy.
> >
> > This discrepancy is the following: in a few trials I participated,
> > and some about I heard of, people use normal PKI with openssl and
> > normal certificates in cars, over IP, on cellular links like 4G.
> > They work fine.  The CA is a local CA (not a commercial CA), but the
> > concept _is_ compatible with normal CAs.  These dont use the ETSI
> > ITS-specific certificates, neither the 1609.2 certificates.
> >
> > I think there are more such trial deployments using local (but
> > standard, openssl PKIs and certificates) than there are trials using
> > ETSI ITS certificates or 1609.2 certificates.  The reason is because
> > the former is all open source software and freely accessible
> > standards, whereas 1609.2 are closed documents and ETSI ITS
> > certificate software is not integrated in mainline software like
> > openssl.
> >
> > There are many easily accessible CAs (Certificate Authorities) that
> > are integrated in the Internet and in main web browsers, whereas the
> > ITS-specific CAs are closed, hard to access and the certificate are
> > expensive.  Many strong oppinions maintain that it should stay that
> > way: cars PKI different than Internet PKI.
> >
> > There should be one Internet, and that means one trust, and one PKI.
> >
> > Everything else should not be done at IETF, I think; hence my comment
> > about this particular RFC.
> >
> > That is my humble oppinion.
> >
> > I would like to hear other oppinions?  Maybe I miss something...
> >
> > Alex
> >
> > _______________________________________________ its mailing list
> > [e-mail] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its
> >
> > _______________________________________________ its mailing list
> > [e-mail] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its
> >
>
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