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Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Tue, 17 September 2019 13:55 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Rob Wilton (rwilton)" <rwilton@cisco.com>, Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
CC: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2019 13:54:46 +0000
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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  *   In ietf-crypto-types I would define the base identities for:



hash-algorithm, asymmetric-key-algorithm, mac-algorithm, encryption-algorithm, encryption-and-mac-algorithm, signature-algorithm, key-exchange-algorithm

I am not very comfortable with that division, as the same key material can be used in multiple places, and we’re transporting key material.  A symmetric key can be used to both encrypt data, and to do an HMAC “signature.”  As a minor note, it omits Key Derivation Functions, KDF, which are a key part of TLS 1.3 and used for “exporting” keys from TLS up to the application layer among other things.


  *   The key step is that I would say that NETCONF should only standardizes the ones that we need now.

A very strong yes for this.


  *     For the others, we could potentially create the YANG modules and either hand this off to the security groups, or work whether them to standardize these through the appropriate WGs.

I think it would be worthwhile to contact the Security AD’s and ask for time to present this somewhere, like the open SAAG meeting.

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