Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Wed, 18 September 2019 19:02 UTC
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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 19:02:53 +0000
In-Reply-To: <20190918174107.lqipsd2qal5x7eom@anna.jacobs.jacobs-university.de>
Cc: "Rob Wilton (rwilton)" <rwilton@cisco.com>, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Juergen Schoenwaelder <J.Schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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> On my Linux system, certs tend to be stoed in pem format, so I am > biased. It seems some other applications like web browsers and server > also tend to use pem format. But I am happy to be corrected since my > experience with cert usage is limited. > > Yes, the application or presentation could convert between formats and > solve all problems. One of the failures of SNMP was that SNMP required > an application or presentation layer to be usable while CLIs did not > require other tools. The idea that there is always software between > the NC/RC server and whoever has to solve an automation problem has > somehow failed in the past. I believe data models should be written to > enable automation without requiring lots of additional tooling. And > yes, there is a need to find a balance. Use a union statement? The 'string' type for PEM and 'binary' for DER? >>> The SSH implementations that I use have the binary key data rendered >>> in ASCII. In fact, the whole key record is rendered in ASCII. I >>> strongly suggest to use formats that are well established. >> >> This is the "key-data" leaf from RFC 7317. Are you saying that it should've been different? >> >> Regardless, should this be a presentation layer issue? > > See above, if we start to require a presentation layer, we may repeat > a failure. It might be useful to check who has implemented that part > of RFC 7317 and how happy operators were with the format. I personally > would not immediately know how to convert my openssh key in a binary > format such that that I can use the YANG model. We should try to > maximize usability and stay away from the idea that a presentation > layer will be available to make things usable for people that have to > script customized automation solutions. Use a union for this too? string vs binary? One issue is that your file-format is most likely an OpenSSH-specific format, which is likely duplicated by other SSH implementations. Is it too much of an assumption to use that format as the defacto 'string' format? Perhaps we should define a custom type (e.g., openssh-string) to use instead of "string"? Kent // contributor
- [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- [netconf] FW: crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Holland, Jake
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] [Taps] crypto-types fallback strate… tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Wang Haiguang
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund