[Ntp] Antw: [EXT] Re: NTPv5 draft

Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de> Tue, 08 December 2020 09:50 UTC

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Date: Tue, 08 Dec 2020 10:50:35 +0100
From: Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de>
To: doug.arnold@meinberg-usa.com, "philipp@redfish-solutions.com" <philipp@redfish-solutions.com>
Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Dieter Sibold <dsibold.ietf@gmail.com>, "ntp@ietf.org" <ntp@ietf.org>, mlichvar@redhat.com
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Subject: [Ntp] Antw: [EXT] Re: NTPv5 draft
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>>> Philip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com> schrieb am 07.12.2020
um
23:25 in Nachricht
<E67C9778-5EAF-42F8-805A-F64BEA8FF44A@redfish-solutions.com>:
> If you’re saying “we all agree […] it could be optional” then I dissent.
> 
> I think that “private networks” and the notion of “the Intranet as 
> implicitly secure” and the term “inside the perimeter” will fall by the 
> wayside before 2030.
> 
> One of my previous employers (Gigamon) built an entire business model on the

> assumption that you need to monitor internal traffic for malware, insider 
> attacks, etc. and hence marketed “network visibility appliances” (i.e. 
> switches and taps that could intercept traffic and clone it to an IDS for 
> real-time analysis).  The market apparently agrees.
> 
> Those that don’t think they need security inside their perimeter are simply

> those that haven’t had an insider attack, or someone bring in a contaminated

> laptop onto the campus network, etc… or haven’t yet realized that they
have.

I think the bigger problem is some trojan sent from external having access to
the internal (unsecured) network.
Most employees have to sign that they don't do evil things and they don't
publish confidential information, so I don't see insiders being that evil, but
theere may be bosses using that argument to monitor what their emplyees do
(which may be illegal just the same way...).

Regards,
Ulrich