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Re: [Ntp] NTPv5 draft

Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com> Tue, 01 December 2020 09:02 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Dec 2020 10:02:13 +0100
From: Miroslav Lichvar <mlichvar@redhat.com>
To: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Cc: Dieter Sibold <dsibold.ietf@gmail.com>, ntp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] NTPv5 draft
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On Tue, Dec 01, 2020 at 09:50:51AM +0100, Kurt Roeckx wrote:
> If devices like switches can be involved in the protocol too, do
> we also want their data to be authenticated?

If it was easy and practical, maybe. But I suspect it would be
difficult to implement and not very practical. The corrections made by
network devices are expected to be smaller than what a MITM attacker
can generally do by delaying authenticated packets, so there is not
much of a point in authenticating the correction field.

-- 
Miroslav Lichvar

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