Re: [Pearg] [saag] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?

[Eliot Lear <[e-mail]>]

On 04.01.23 20:53, Christian Huitema wrote:
> The problem is that the IP address is linked to the server and user 
> identity. Tracking the source and destination pair allows on path 
> entities to check which user contacts what server. It also allows 
> servers to check the identity of their client and their location. 
> Servers may have other ways to check identity such as cookies or 
> client login, but the client IP address provides location information 
> on top of that.

The thrust of my point is whether we need to make prohibitively 
expensive L3 changes.  OHTTP and ODNS demonstrate at a *technical level* 
that we do not.  But see below.


>
> The big issue behind that are of course performance and economics. 
> Using such relays degrades performance somewhat, if only because of 
> double or triple encryption: will the users accept that reduced 
> performance? And then, operating relays has a cost. Who will pay for 
> that? If the users do pay for that, how does the users pay without 
> disclosing their identities to the relays, and thus enable monitoring? 
> If the users do not pay, how can we sure of the intentions of whoever 
> is paying for the relays?

However you slice this, whether at L3 or above, you will have this 
problem.  This is true even with LISP, because the XTR requires an 
mapping function, and those things don't run for free either.  So it's 
probably good to distill the principles here, as you have done.  Many of 
the performance and cost issues are the same.

Eliot