Re: [Rats] draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00 comments

[Shawn Willden <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Jun 19, 2019 at 4:30 AM Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>
wrote:

>
> Thomas Fossati <[e-mail]> wrote:
>     > On 27/03/2019, 18:25, "RATS on behalf of Michael Richardson"
>     > <[e-mail] on behalf of [e-mail]> wrote:
>     >> (Still looking for some pointers to *attestion* parts of the Android
>     >> KeyStore.)
>
>     > Maybe you want to take a look at [1]
>
>     > Cheers, t
>
>     > [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.05572.pdf
>
> Thank you. It was a really interesting read.
> What I learnt is that Android mostly attests to the location of a device
> signing key.


This is correct.  Originally, keystore attestation was intended *only* to
prove that a key (a) lived in a thought-to-be-secure environment and (b)
that the key had a certain set of properties.  The scope has expanded a bit
to also attest to some bits of information about the device state, at least
as it was at boot time.



> I think that this is an implementation of the device-type attestation that
> FIDO cares about.
>

It can serve that purpose, yes.


>   ]The paper and the referenced info at:
>   https://developer.android.com/training/articles/security-key-attestation
>
> does not give me additional use case, but I have other reading that I have
> not yet finished.
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>
>
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-- 
Shawn Willden | Staff Software Engineer | [e-mail] | 720-924-6645