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Re: [Rats] More use cases for draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Fri, 05 July 2019 18:39 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 14:39:23 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Rats] More use cases for draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00
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    >> > A session based attestation is the combination of a static attestation
    >> > and the creation of a shared session key.  That is, possible

t
    >> > operations using the shared session key "inherit" the initial
    >> > attestation.  Such operations use MAC signatures and symmetric
    >> > encryption (using keys derived from the session key) in order to form a
    >> > protected API.  Ideally a session based attestation scheme also
    >> > provides "atomic" operation, terminated by a "commit" call.

    mcr> I understand.  I'm not sure what to change, if anything, based upon
    mcr> your comments.

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
    > Doesn't TEEP represent yet another attestation concept where each
    > operation is attested?

I certainly what to discuss this more.
My understanding is that TEEP is looking for (and has probably found, via
SUIT) a way for code to admitted into the trusted area from a network source.

While I can imagine that the resulting new code might affect the measurements
that get attested to, I'm not sure they are a use case distinct from
other verified boot use cases.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

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