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Re: [Rats] Android attestations: Re: draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00 comments

Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com> Thu, 20 June 2019 13:31 UTC

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Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 09:31:40 -0400
From: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
To: Shawn Willden <swillden=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
CC: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, Anthony Nadalin <tonynad=40microsoft.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Laurence Lundblade <lgl@island-resort.com>, Thomas Fossati <Thomas.Fossati@arm.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
Message-ID: <D93100A6.E0A23%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Thread-Topic: [Rats] Android attestations: Re: draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00 comments
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Subject: Re: [Rats] Android attestations: Re: draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00 comments
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>> <snip>
> The Android platform security team considers this an anti-goal.  We're very
> concerned that the scope of functionality being installed in TEEs is exploding
> to a degree that the TEEs are becoming less trustworthy, not more (and they
> haven't been particularly good).  Not only do we not want to enable
> field-installation of TAs, we'd like to constrain factory/OTA installation to
> smaller sets (some devices ship with upwards of 40 TAs today), though our
> ability to do that is very limited.

+1
> 
> There's a tension here between enabling more use cases and maintaining /
> increasing the security of existing use cases. We recognize that GP and many
> others disagree with us on how to balance the issues, and that perhaps we're
> wrong, but we have to respond to the Android ecosystem as we see it.

Re: more use cases, the ability to encrypt a key attestation in TEE/SE for a
specific provisioning end point would be nice to have (to conceal a
challenge password while in transit, for example).
>

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