Re: [Rats] More use cases for draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> Thu, 20 June 2019 05:28 UTC

Return-Path: <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C3C6120471 for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:28:14 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.999
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Ky8UDHzc8MgL for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:28:12 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-wm1-x32c.google.com (mail-wm1-x32c.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::32c]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D790F12008D for <rats@ietf.org>; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:28:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-wm1-x32c.google.com with SMTP id f17so1719238wme.2 for <rats@ietf.org>; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:28:11 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date:user-agent :mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language:content-transfer-encoding; bh=maLfA8XZeQLMIR2L8+n4LdlJacsEvk3DNH/fkawc1W4=; b=AAinqx3FS2P9DZkDzkccUpHHa07GnSop0tzA8xSvkKknqhFsaL3/q+8UaCisBUv6V0 Xh//HqZ1+c/Vqs2TsM6r/ZmraTlOKw95xti7g32TvH0tZo4oJlhARfsvFVExwd9sXha9 cdQm/euux/RulQQqDQB0u7j6OOv/5/phMKW8CGFUxAQO7zqF9N3++YrRwyGPEGJWICCJ wl1kJppNMmdcTUHqxTUeMZFlpM9MgFBxh5HLGyjYrgSFSHMln1ja/N0ucOCJr83fULKD 2Z3D83GNX9RzWYNziCRWX7gIkJdroZONoY9qGo1NLMTR8sRe0TGhwuCPWN8/85kVa8sq LTHg==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:cc:references:from:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-language :content-transfer-encoding; bh=maLfA8XZeQLMIR2L8+n4LdlJacsEvk3DNH/fkawc1W4=; b=oczyy9+cB2NpBKMogy+PYlGLdlm3jXTqoeaPTePEgBK8cLjF2GkQhWbJsWoKS5EGrM 2yR2gQWp9dH+2g4G7YVp7jLKPpUB2lhASh5UeGQXMWhtVhmoLq9rBKWm+dy7rd5qFdsA 2pKsLWd9o8RX0PDRQokTy2WyLRMYh2JjkxFwoPkHQRB54t8jTXY2mYDQzYz2K3EvkT+z NVmUFMuuikCyQbM8q94m7qW812KqSKKP7Gw5JT4gSY5f8pMpyeAaIZ7OreMJuhBnNlca jxVT9RyMtI14942ozBhPi+BbuevFiromrPmumoktCdsw6J2rpykXadpx4k7sWJAZwS0w uIMg==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUB2LL46TpLVG0Hu7jNpWnEzXwO5AyCU2FEcqD8VXUpwuDMCmZi xt5sjOUeMdH3/yfdZMK99GUjD/DLSCs=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxp6CxBZ2xDt2/KPke3MCppQ1ZKAlP0I6IO8BvDREydVoBnMjfrYdUj1r3fxeadRuq/FqCcOg==
X-Received: by 2002:a1c:a019:: with SMTP id j25mr958364wme.95.1561008490014; Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:28:10 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.1.79] (25.131.146.77.rev.sfr.net. [77.146.131.25]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id m9sm17694999wrr.14.2019.06.19.22.28.08 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 19 Jun 2019 22:28:08 -0700 (PDT)
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>, "rats@ietf.org" <rats@ietf.org>
References: <MW2PR00MB03963ABEB87211AD28A16240A6490@MW2PR00MB0396.namprd00.prod.outlook.com> <12503.1552447661@localhost> <58E37DB5-098C-4387-9A52-4AECD0F69F25@island-resort.com> <6495.1553219901@dooku.sandelman.ca> <BA6E28A7-0F6A-46A8-AB1B-A64B9229F149@intel.com> <507.1553725386@dooku.sandelman.ca> <24C0968B-32B0-4EF1-99C8-61D3F0955BA1@intel.com> <793F9A34-050F-4914-AF4B-08C072730A06@island-resort.com> <D8C23800.D851F%carl@redhoundsoftware.com> <19652.1553943890@dooku.sandelman.ca> <D8C50A67.D8999%carl@redhoundsoftware.com> <79ccb2d7-09a3-913d-f47d-1e702a23b341@gmail.com> <29183.1560536152@localhost> <9a7e3efe-b021-f255-4afd-649ea0d5772d@gmail.com> <19489.1560973504@localhost>
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e43e8f26-9692-0d0e-8eae-2ae74edcf5c0@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 07:28:06 +0200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <19489.1560973504@localhost>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/r56fYRgD9PU8SEl_s5kYi96euUI>
Subject: Re: [Rats] More use cases for draft-richardson-rats-usecases-00
X-BeenThere: rats@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Remote Attestation Procedures <rats.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/>
List-Post: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 05:28:14 -0000

On 2019-06-19 21:45, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote:
>      > Hi Michael,
> 
>      > A session based attestation is the combination of a static attestation
>      > and the creation of a shared session key.  That is, possible subsequent
>      > operations using the shared session key "inherit" the initial
>      > attestation.  Such operations use MAC signatures and symmetric
>      > encryption (using keys derived from the session key) in order to form a
>      > protected API.  Ideally a session based attestation scheme also
>      > provides "atomic" operation, terminated by a "commit" call.
> 
> I understand.  I'm not sure what to change, if anything, based upon your
> comments.

Doesn't TEEP represent yet another attestation concept where each operation
is attested?

To me it looks that most if not all attestation schemes provide platform-related
data but they also combine that with application-specific data like keys in Android,
arbitrary operations like in TEEP, or the creation of a shared session key
like in SKS/KeyGen2.  I would consider splitting these topics since they appear
to be fairly independent.

Anders

> 
> --
> Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
>   -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
> 
> 
>