Re: [sidr] [Idr] BGPSEC proposal to drop AS_PATH [was: Fwd: request for agenda items for interim meeting 6 Jun]

[Robert Raszuk <[e-mail]>]

Let's observe that mangling with AS_PATH is usually done for a reason .. 
to achieve reachability to some set of prefixes which otherwise would be 
dropped.

So with this in mind a better question to think about from customer 
perspective is to choose either:

- unsecure but reachable Internet destinations
- secure Internet routing but unreachable destinations

Rgs,
R.

PS. I believe I have a solution to address both sides. Let me write it 
up and share in a week or two.

>> This leaves me feeling a little more sanguine about the
>> drop-the-AS_PATH idea, although I still think some more attention to
>> enumerating what knobs will fall by the wayside is advisable.
>
> as folk keep inventing new knobs, one question would seem to be whether
> the knob inventors will understand and accept the trust/threat model
> implications of knobs which force downgrade to non-sec.
>
> randy
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