Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?

[Stephen Kent <[e-mail]>]

At 10:39 PM -0500 1/19/12, Eric Osterweil wrote:
>...
>  >
>>  Even if there are many fewer certs, inconsistent caches would pose 
>>a problem. Unless we're discussing an emergency rekey for a cert, 
>>the smart procedure is to post a new cert well before the old one 
>>expires, allowing RPs to retrieve the new one in plenty of time.
>
>Yeah, I agree with your comment about getting keys out ahead of 
>time.  However, with a corpus of keys that could well order in the 
>millions, I would worry that the inherent churn and resource 
>requirements are going to be well more than we are (or at least I 
>was) expecting.

speak for yourself :-).

>  > There is not yet an operational guidance doc for router cert 
>management, but
>>  I anticipate this sort of guidance will appear there.
>
>Will it include some discussion about scaling?  I think this 
>key-per-router idea could turn out to be Pandora's box.  While 
>having a key or two per AS or per prefix may allow us to use 
>elements of today's routing system to give us some idea about how 
>churn and dynamics _may_ look, I'm kind of worried now that we 
>haven't properly evaluated how enormous the resource dependencies 
>will be with per-router-keys.  Are there any specific plans to write 
>this up anywhere?

I anticipate that an operational considerations doc will be written.

Steve