Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?

["Sriram, Kotikalapudi" <[e-mail]>]

>For that matter, what do people think about the issue that a private key 
>could simply be covertly extracted from an AS' routers that are deployed 
>in far off lands?  Wouldn't this kind of compromise be a terrifying security 
>threat to most ISPs?  

Eric,

We (BGPSEC document authors) had considered this problem.
It is mitigated by having 'Key per Router' as discussed in:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices-01#section-4.5

4.5.   Key Per Router (Rouge Router Problem)

4.5.1.  Decision

   Within each AS, each individual BGPSEC router can have a unique pair
   of private and public keys.

4.5.2.  Discussion

   If a router is compromised, its key pair can be revoked
   independently, without disrupting the other routers in the AS.  Each
   per-router key-pair will be represented in an end-entity certificate
   issued under the CA cert of the AS.  The Subject Key Identifier (SKI)
   in the signature points to the router certificate (and thus the
   unique public key) of the router that affixed its signature, so that
   a validating router can reliably identify the public key to use for
   signature verification.

Sriram

P.S. In case you had not seen the cited document
(draft-sriram-bgpsec-design-choices) before,
it is a design rationale discussion document and is a companion to
draft-lepinski-bgpsec-protocol-00.txt (our initial individual draft submission).