Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?

Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com> Mon, 30 January 2012 23:04 UTC

Return-Path: <rbarnes@bbn.com>
X-Original-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: sidr@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA8B721F87AE for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 30 Jan 2012 15:04:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -106.404
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-106.404 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.195, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IFY1GVNY722e for <sidr@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 30 Jan 2012 15:04:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.bbn.com (smtp.bbn.com [128.33.1.81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B803F21F875B for <sidr@ietf.org>; Mon, 30 Jan 2012 15:04:49 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [128.89.254.25] (port=50645) by smtp.bbn.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES128-SHA:128) (Exim 4.77 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <rbarnes@bbn.com>) id 1Rs0HG-000Jge-DS; Mon, 30 Jan 2012 18:04:46 -0500
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1251.1)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
From: Richard Barnes <rbarnes@bbn.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAH1iCiqGr8BJOk6nOpuTGTYNVJUwvXcdumTYbc=u1jBzyZQzmA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Jan 2012 00:04:44 +0100
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <B9054546-5C07-4DA4-80C1-E69FC1F487EA@bbn.com>
References: <13269421-8A36-4628-9F1A-30E02B922AE1@verisign.com> <24B20D14B2CD29478C8D5D6E9CBB29F6074CA8@Hermes.columbia.ads.sparta.com> <A0B7EE2D-8E59-4DC8-9DC0-140E9574B479@verisign.com> <p06240804cb3caa4fd051@128.89.89.66> <CCE15AEB-D606-4A59-8118-BA5CD53413E8@verisign.com> <p06240807cb3e3e117777@128.89.89.66> <12C07EA1-EDC5-4F88-99F7-B57B9AF53C53@verisign.com> <p06240801cb43712287ed@10.243.32.68> <79053E60-25FE-4A84-9391-F451C8F0E720@verisign.com> <p06240818cb477d54edae@128.89.89.66> <CAH1iCiq04z2k+q2xBFGmnoRyuHmrE44_8cdgjTN4JVg6YwJALw@mail.gmail.com> <24B20D14B2CD29478C8D5D6E9CBB29F6077830@Hermes.columbia.ads.sparta.com> <CAH1iCip4qD4ePPEng7uNVjz9ebO1U5A4oN_Dd5YneELxTUWrVw@mail.gmail.com> <p06240810cb4cc0b0119f@128.89.89.190> <CAH1iCiqGr8BJOk6nOpuTGTYNVJUwvXcdumTYbc=u1jBzyZQzmA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1251.1)
Cc: "Murphy, Sandra" <Sandra.Murphy@sparta.com>, "sidr@ietf.org list" <sidr@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [sidr] Key learning procedures in BGPsec?
X-BeenThere: sidr@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Secure Interdomain Routing <sidr.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr>
List-Post: <mailto:sidr@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr>, <mailto:sidr-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2012 23:04:50 -0000

On Jan 30, 2012, at 11:57 PM, Brian Dickson wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 4:52 PM, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote:
>> At 2:57 PM -0500 1/30/12, Brian Dickson wrote:
>>> 
>>> There are other kinds of encryption as well, which involve shared
>>> keys, or in case of DH, random session keys with neither party
>>> having/needing the other's key material.
>> 
>> 
>> not true. DH key agreement requires that each party receive the public
>> key of the other, in order to compute a shared secret.
> 
> In DH, each side generates a random (per-session) private key, and
> computes _a_ public key (which is exchanged), off of that private key
> .
> 
> Here's the thing - the "public key" in DH is not pre-published, nor is
> it re-used. It is a one-use, fire-and-forget object, as are the
> private key and shared key.
> 
> This is different from a published (public) key material a la PKI. PKI
> keys are longer-lived and multiple-use.
> 
> In DH, neither party has the other's key _before_ they start their DH
> exchange. That was my point.


<hat type="pedantic"/>

I do not think that word (DH) means what you think it means
Diffie-Hellman is an algorithm on groups that have hard discrete log problems.  It has nothing to do with key management.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman_key_exchange>

I think what you mean to say is DH with *ephemeral* keys.  That is not a necessary property.  You can have even DH keys in certificates.
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2631>