Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-09.txt> (Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) to Best Current Practice

[Keith Moore <[e-mail]>]

On 11/30/20 7:29 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:

> So I think the text should include wording to the effect that it applies to
> public Internet use but not to embedded/SCADA/etc for which very different
> considerations apply.

I've been thinking something like this also.  But IMO there are still 
valid cases for negotiating older versions of TLS on the public 
Internet, such as the mail relaying case mentioned earlier.    So far I 
haven't thought of a reason where either (a) bouncing an email message; 
(b) resending it in cleartext; or (c) discarding it, is better than 
relaying with TLS 1.0 or 1.1. (Though maybe there aren't enough MTAs 
that do opportunistic TLS using version <= 1.1 to matter.)

More generally, the right remedial behavior for an application with e2e 
connectivity and an interactive UI that can't do better than TLS 1.1, 
isn't necessarily the right behavior for all applications.

So maybe two restrictions on scope?  (1) public Internet; (2) e2e and 
interactive application?

But it's important to understand that protocols and protocol 
implementations that are used on the public Internet are also used on 
isolated and mostly-isolated networks.

Given that this is BCP and not standards-track, maybe it should just be 
made clear that an implementation that does support 1.0 or 1.1 isn't 
necessarily violating the standard, it's just discouraged as a practice.

Keith