Re: [TLS] DSA should die

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 16:57 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 12:57:09 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] DSA should die
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On Thursday, April 02, 2015 12:45:35 pm Nico Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 2:39 AM, CodesInChaos <codesinchaos@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I think full a-la-carte is too complex. But I'm for negotiating the
> > handshake and symmetric crypto separately. They're already very
> > loosely coupled and most proposals that introduce/obsolete
> > ciphersuites are only interested in one of the two sides, with the
> > other being only an afterthought.
> 
> That would be a huge improvement over what we have now.

That could be a good middle ground. Just split cipher suites into essentially asymmetric & symmetric cipher suites, and put them both in the same array. Server just picks one of each for handshake & connection.


Dave