Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> Mon, 21 September 2020 12:54 UTC
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From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2020 14:53:53 +0200
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Cc: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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tls-se memory footprint is flash 《 40KB ram 《 1KB time to open a tls session 1.4 seconds Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:47, Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> a écrit : > hi Hannes > > no openssl or wolfssl are used as client in order to check > interoperability with tls-se server > > tls-se is of course a specific implémentation for tls13 server in > javacard..it is written in java but an ôter implémentation is written in c > for constraint notes. as written in the draft tls-se implementation has > three software blocks: crypto lib, tls state machine, and tls lib > > > > Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:36, Hannes Tschofenig < > Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit : > >> Hi Pascal, >> >> >> >> are you saying that the stack on the secure element uses WolfSSL or >> OpenSSL? I am sure that WolfSSL works well but for code size reasons I >> doubt OpenSSL is possible. Can you confirm? >> >> >> >> In case of WolfSSL, you have multiple options for credentials, including >> plain PSK, PSK-ECDHE, raw public keys, and certificates as I noted in my >> mail to the UTA list: >> >> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/uta/RJ4wU77D6f7qslfwrc16jkrPTew/ >> >> >> >> Ciao >> >> Hannes >> >> >> >> *From:* Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> >> *Sent:* Monday, September 21, 2020 2:01 PM >> *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> >> *Cc:* Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>; tls@ietf.org >> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 >> >> >> >> Hi Hannes >> >> >> >> Yes it has been tested with several 3.04 Javacards commercially >> available >> >> >> >> In the draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00 Section >> 5-ISO 7816 Use Case, the exchanges are done with the existing implementation >> >> >> >> TLS-SE TLS1.3 PSK+ECDH server works with ESP8266 or Arduino+Ethernet >> boards >> >> >> >> For client software we use OPENSSL or WolfSSL >> >> >> >> Pascal >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 12:35, Hannes Tschofenig < >> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit : >> >> Hi Pascal, >> >> Thanks for the pointer to the draft. >> >> Since I am surveying implementations for the update of RFC 7925 (see >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile/) I >> was wondering whether there is an implementation of this approach. >> >> Ciao >> Hannes >> >> >> From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> >> Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 11:44 AM >> To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> >> Cc: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>; tls@ietf.org >> Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 >> >> Hi All >> >> Here is an example of PSK+ECDHE for IoT >> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00 uses TLS1.3 server >> PSK+ECDHE for secure elements >> >> The security level in these devices is as high as EAL5+ >> >> The computing time is about 1.4s for a PSK+ECDHE session (AES-128-CCM, + >> secp256r1) >> >> The real critical resource is the required RAM size, less than 1KB in our >> experiments >> >> The secure element only needs a classical TCP/IP interface (i.e. sockets >> like) >> >> Trusted PSK should avoid selfie attacks >> >> Pascal >> >> >> >> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 11:29, Hannes Tschofenig <mailto: >> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit : >> Hi Filippo, >> >> • Indeed, if the SCADA industry has a particular need, they should >> profile TLS for use in that industry, and not require we change the >> recommendation for the open Internet. >> >> We have an IoT profile for TLS and it talks about the use of PSK, see >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7925 >> >> On the “open Internet” (probably referring to the Web usage) you are not >> going to use PSKs in TLS. There is a separate RFC that provides >> recommendations for that environmnent, see RFC 752. That RFC is currently >> being revised, see >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis/ >> >> Ciao >> Hannes >> >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are >> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended >> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the >> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the >> information in any medium. Thank you. >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> mailto:TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are >> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended >> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the >> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the >> information in any medium. Thank you. >> >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are >> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended >> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the >> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the >> information in any medium. Thank you. >> >
- [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 John Mattsson
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Filippo Valsorda
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Filippo Valsorda
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 David Woodhouse
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 David Benjamin
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Lanlan Pan
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Filippo Valsorda
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Pascal Urien
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Carrick Bartle
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Rob Sayre
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Achim Kraus
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3 Rob Sayre