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Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3

"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu> Tue, 29 September 2020 16:49 UTC

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From: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
To: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2020 16:49:04 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/qiRyuJ87bHkREtf6Ctj7t31keqQ>
Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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I share Achim's concerns. 

But I believe the explanations will turn out mostly useless in the real world, as the "lawyers" of the industry are guaranteed to steer away from something "not recommended".

In one word: bad.

On 9/29/20, 12:31, "TLS on behalf of Achim Kraus" <tls-bounces@ietf.org on behalf of achimkraus@gmx.net> wrote:

    Hi list,

    I'm still worrying about the "recommended" and the (mis-)interpretation
    of that. I'm fine with the explanation

    ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Note

         If an item is not marked as "Recommended", it does not
         necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that
         the item either has not been through the IETF consensus process,
         has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use
         cases.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------

    but, I feel uncomfortable considering too many decision makers will not
    read that details. Though the "recommendation" is changing over the
    time, I would feel more comfortable, if the N would be amended by the
    Y-period.

    e.g. N (was Y 2001-2015)

    FMPOV, if someone reads that, it may explain, that the N is a recent one
    and some use-case will still need some time to adapt for the new
    recommendations.

    best regards
    Achim Kraus

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