Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3

[Pascal Urien <[e-mail]>]

Hi All

Here is an example of PSK+ECDHE for IoT

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00  uses TLS1.3 server
PSK+ECDHE for secure elements

The security level in these devices is as high as EAL5+

The computing time is about 1.4s for a PSK+ECDHE session (AES-128-CCM, +
secp256r1)

The real critical resource is the required RAM size, less than 1KB in our
experiments

The secure element  only needs a classical TCP/IP interface (i.e. sockets
like)

Trusted PSK should avoid selfie attacks

Pascal



Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 11:29, Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>
a écrit :

> Hi Filippo,
>
>
>
>    - Indeed, if the SCADA industry has a particular need, they should
>    profile TLS for use in that industry, and not require we change the
>    recommendation for the open Internet.
>
>
>
> We have an IoT profile for TLS and it talks about the use of PSK, see
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7925
>
>
>
> On the “open Internet” (probably referring to the Web usage) you are not
> going to use PSKs in TLS. There is a separate RFC that provides
> recommendations for that environmnent, see RFC 752. That RFC is currently
> being revised, see draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis-00
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis/>
>
>
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
>
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