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Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Sun, 09 November 2014 19:25 UTC

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Date: Sun, 09 Nov 2014 11:25:27 -0800
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] OPTLS: Signature-less TLS 1.3
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On 8 November 2014 08:06, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> wrote:
> To achieve this separation of purpose, though, we'd need to be able to
> distinguish between certificates capable of anchoring the end entity in
> a TLS 1.2 session and certificates capable of certifying a long-term
> g^s.  Making these distinguishable would probably require a new X.509v3
> extension, or extendedKeyUsage.


There may still be operational advantages: you could issue the 1.2
cert with a shorter lifetime and the 1.3 cert with a longer one.

Mucking with X.509 would probably make this harder than its worth, I think.

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