Re: [ietf-822] one can re-sign without a permission to re-sign header

[Douglas Otis <[e-mail]>]

On May 1, 2014, at 12:54 PM, John Levine <[e-mail]> wrote:

>> author's site. That shouldn't require the mailing list to communicate 
>> with the author's site, but it might require the author's site to get 
>> something from the mailing list's site.
> 
> That seems overcomplicated.  Just make the expiration time fairly
> short, since it's a rare mailing list that takes more than a day to do
> its thing.
> 
>>> Perhaps it's time for a more concrete proposal to be written down.
> 
> It occurred to me that there's a very simple way to do this:
> 
> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-levine-may-forward/

Dear John,

Thank you for taking time to create this draft.  It seems to meet Pete's expectations.  As suggested, it also provides a repository of replay-able cryptographic tokens aimed at defeating both DMARC and DKIM protection when used in a timely fashion.  Should all mailing-lists hold DMARC protected messages until DKIM signatures expire?  Perhaps even add warnings in the friendly name that such messages are only intended for third-party services.

Author Domains still need to signal their understanding of the message's destination. Not really any different from TPA, but TPA does not impact how mailing-lists or other third-party services work, or potentially defeat protections of other messages, or change the signatures being applied. At least, this draft suggests the Author Domain cares about the harm their DMARC policy might cause.  Setting p=quarantine seems much easier.

Regards,
Douglas Otis