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Re: [saag] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?

Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com> Thu, 05 January 2023 09:14 UTC

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Subject: Re: [saag] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?
From: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <5e37bbe7-c785-6f52-7841-6562d8e77fe1@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2023 09:13:48 +0000
Cc: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>, George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org>, Lloyd W <lloyd.wood=40yahoo.co.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>, Antoine FRESSANCOURT <antoine.fressancourt=40huawei.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>, pearg@irtf.org, John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, saag <saag@ietf.org>, Dino Farinacci <farinacci@gmail.com>, hrpc@irtf.org
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References: <3c3230f3783b4ec9a8a9e3bb87cc2a8d@huawei.com> <08C49067-DB4C-41AB-A6F3-B96BDBE0A4BC@yahoo.co.uk> <CAKr6gn0tFXEV-h7LH1_Ts5iQRw_mGEi=TqS7hsyK-SqDFmmY-A@mail.gmail.com> <5e37bbe7-c785-6f52-7841-6562d8e77fe1@gmail.com>
To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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That was 2014

MPLS was an old (and widely deployed) protocol by then and is sourceless even in mp2p applications.

Stewart

> On 4 Jan 2023, at 21:24, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Credit where it's due: Sourceless Network Architecture was described many years ago:
> 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-849.pdf
> 
> Regards
>   Brian
> 
> On 04-Jan-23 22:35, George Michaelson wrote:
>> Put a nonce source ip in the packet header and the real source as 4-16 bytes of PFS protected payload.
>> Use asymmetric routing. A single point of capture which isn't close to source or destination is occluded.
>> Can't fix a warrant tap, but can at least obfuscate for on-path.
>> G
>

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