Re: Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?

Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com> Wed, 04 January 2023 14:59 UTC

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From: Dave Taht <dave.taht@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 04 Jan 2023 06:59:16 -0800
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Subject: Re: Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?
To: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "hrpc@irtf.org" <hrpc@irtf.org>, "pearg@irtf.org" <pearg@irtf.org>, saag <saag@ietf.org>
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On Wed, Jan 4, 2023 at 6:34 AM Vittorio Bertola
<vittorio.bertola=40open-xchange.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> Il 03/01/2023 11:27 CET John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> ha scritto:
>
> - Threat Model: The IETF has failed to update the Internet Threat Model to include compromised endpoints, misbehaving endpoints, and large centralized information sources. This is very disappointing as these things were, and still are major enablers for pervasive monitoring. Assuming compromise is an essential zero trust principle. The excellent IAB document RFC 7624 that talks about compromise and exfiltration deserve much more citations.
>
> There were attempts to do this, and even a dedicated IAB program and mailing list, which was wrapped up without results just a few months ago. I still think this was a big fail; in fact, this implies that counteraction against surveillance capitalism practices can only happen elsewhere, at the regulatory level, as the IETF community either does not know what to do about it, or does not want to do anything about it.

What bothers me most today are that "modern" OSes, like chromebooks,
android, ios, have no way to do a packet capture of "their side" of
your computer. Not even being able to know what IPs my own device is
talking to (or blocking some) makes me a tad... paranoid.

Privacy and control for whom?

> --
>
> Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
> vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com
> Office @ Via Treviso 12, 10144 Torino, Italy



-- 
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