Re: [saag] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Wed, 04 January 2023 21:24 UTC

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Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2023 10:24:27 +1300
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Subject: Re: [saag] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?
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To: George Michaelson <ggm@algebras.org>, Lloyd W <lloyd.wood=40yahoo.co.uk@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Antoine FRESSANCOURT <antoine.fressancourt=40huawei.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>, pearg@irtf.org, John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, saag <saag@ietf.org>, Dino Farinacci <farinacci@gmail.com>, hrpc@irtf.org
References: <3c3230f3783b4ec9a8a9e3bb87cc2a8d@huawei.com> <08C49067-DB4C-41AB-A6F3-B96BDBE0A4BC@yahoo.co.uk> <CAKr6gn0tFXEV-h7LH1_Ts5iQRw_mGEi=TqS7hsyK-SqDFmmY-A@mail.gmail.com>
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
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Credit where it's due: Sourceless Network Architecture was described many years ago:

https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-849.pdf

Regards
    Brian

On 04-Jan-23 22:35, George Michaelson wrote:
> Put a nonce source ip in the packet header and the real source as 4-16 bytes of PFS protected payload.
> 
> Use asymmetric routing. A single point of capture which isn't close to source or destination is occluded.
> 
> Can't fix a warrant tap, but can at least obfuscate for on-path.
> 
> G