Re: [hrpc] [saag] [Pearg] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?

bzs@theworld.com Thu, 05 January 2023 23:05 UTC

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Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2023 18:01:58 -0500
From: bzs@theworld.com
To: trutkowski@netmagic.com
Cc: John Mattsson <john.mattsson=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>, Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>, saag <saag@ietf.org>, "pearg@irtf.org" <pearg@irtf.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "hrpc@irtf.org" <hrpc@irtf.org>
Subject: Re: [hrpc] [saag] [Pearg] Ten years after Snowden (2013 - 2023), is IETF keeping its promises?
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A first positive step would be requirements for full, active
disclosure.

For example as people discovered cookies and how they were being used
several years ago at least some of the negative reaction was surprise
as much as rejection of the idea per se.

Learning how they were being used seemed to be a fairly slow process
including those using them being resistant to disclosure. It took a
lot of reverse engineering and media interest to eventually provide
some insight.

The course of disclosure of Facebook's relationship with Cambridge
Analytics took a similar path. In part it was the actual practices but
also the shock and surprise as those practices became disclosed long
after (in that case) the elections potentially affected were over.

Similar with other newer tracking and surveillance technologies.

So the question is what are the obligations of those using these
technologies (protocols, etc.) for various purposes which can affect
users to actively inform those users and others?

"Others" might include for example their investors since unmanaged or
poorly managed disclosure and media and/or legal or legislative
backlash can certainly affect their company's investment value as we
saw in the kerfuffle between Apple and Facebook over tracking
technologies in apps.

Is this very different from the usual list of risks in a company's 10K
filings -- a US corporate annual report required of public companies
which among other things must list known risks to potential investors?

This is analogous to the recent trend towards listing of ESG
(Environmental, Social, Governance) risks in 10Ks and similar by
public companies. In the past few years characterizing and disclosing
those risks has become a major activity and industry.

-- 
        -Barry Shein

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