Re: [lisp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-lisp-eid-block-03.txt> (LISP EID Block) to Informational RFC

[Cameron Byrne <[e-mail]>]

On Nov 16, 2012 9:27 AM, "Joel M. Halpern" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> Why does any operator have a reason to carr any routes other than their
paying customers?  Because it provides connectivity for their customers.
> If we get this block allocaed, then it results in 1 extra routing entry
in the global routing table to support LISP inter-working.
> An entry that some of their customers may use, whether the operator
carrying it knows that or not.
>
> In fact, it would take significant extra work for the operator to somehow
block this aggregate.
>
> If LISP fails, this is a small cost to find out.
> If LISP succeeds, this results in significant reduction in core tabl
sizes for everyone.
>

Not everyone. Only people who carry core tables.  That is LISP twist, it
transfers cost from a few cores to many edges. Associated pros and cons
exist.

CB
> Yours,
> Joel
>
>
> On 11/16/2012 11:35 AM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
>>
>> Joel,
>>
>> On 16/11/2012 16:00, Joel M. Halpern wrote:
>> ...
>>>
>>> With regard to interworking and deployment, there are a number of
>>> documents that deal with that.  They discuss what the currently
>>> understood deployment incentives are, and what paths are currently seen.
>>>    (As Noel noted, this is an experiment, and one should expect that the
>>> actual path will be different from the expectation.)  Given that
>>> interworkng dives are data plane devices, altruism is clearly not a
>>> sufficient incentive to get this to scale, and the models do not depend
>>> upon that.
>>
>>
>> My concern with this allocation request was not about scaling
>> but about black holes. What are the incentives for operators not
>> very interested in LISP to carry the routes that make it work?
>> That's the root of many of the problems with 6to4 (and, I think,
>> many of the problems of the MBONE, for those with long memories).
>>
>> Regards
>>      Brian
>>