Re: COVID-19 contacts tracker (Re: a brief pondering)

["Joel M. Halpern" <[e-mail]>]

I am either misunderstanding the context of this thread, or I am missing 
an important technical point.

I get the potential value and complexity (in many dimensions including 
privacy) of Covid-19 trackers.

If the thread is intended to encourage folks as individuals to help with 
ongoing efforts to build such things, then okay, I can understand that. 
(Although that is not what I thought I read.)

If the goal is for the IETF to do something, I am missing the technical 
point.  I do not see a protocol development or specification issue.  The 
task has lots of hard parts.  Most in the application space and in the 
data crunching spaces.  (And probably other aspects that I am not 
noticing, but that are also not protocol issues.)  What is the IETF task 
that is being asked for?

Yours,
Joel

On 4/15/2020 2:46 PM, Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:
> 
> On 15 Apr 2020, at 18:42, Keith Moore <[e-mail] 
> <mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
>> On 4/15/20 12:07 PM, Benoit Claise wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> Which leads me to a question: what can this community (and 
>>>> similar/adjacent ones) do productively together to help? What new 
>>>> things are happening on the network from which we can learn and 
>>>> quickly adapt/improve?
>>>>
>>> In my wish list, I would see this community helping with a COVID-19 
>>> contacts tracker:
>>>     - with clear specifications
>>>     - that respects the privacy concerns, for all parties
>>
>> I don't think it's possible.  Anything that can be used to trace 
>> contacts for medical purposes can be used to trace contacts for 
>> political purposes.
> 
> I would beg to differ, though by no means perfect or yet there, the EU 
> recommendations:
> 
> https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/recommendation-apps-contact-tracing_en
> 
> set out quite a 'hard' set of requirements; that by and large match the 
> manifest/expectations of the CCC, de Waag and similar more 
> activist/vigilant privacy groups:
> 
> https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2020/contact-tracing-requirements
> 
> (I picked the DE one, as I could not find english version of the 
> substancially similar NL, FR, SE and DK versions) and designs such as de 
> DP3T design (with a few nits and warts) by and large meet those 
> requirements.
> 
> https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20White%20Paper.pdf 
> <https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T White Paper.pdf>
> 
> This is done by de-centralizing; and essentially constructing the 
> cryptography such that only 'on' the phone is it possible to reconstruct 
> 'has there been a contact' and limiting the scope/purpose to exactly 
> that - have I been close. So no location, no tracking, no recording of 
> position, etc. And with sufficient means for an outside observer to 
> verify this.
> 
> The apple/google proposals are very similar - but are not as limited in 
> `time and place'; potentially more generic.
> 
> Now obviously - there is nothing stopping someone of using the very same 
> spec to accomplish something different; to spike the app, put hidden 
> code in it, etc, etc.  But that is something that we have any way - 
> those that control the phone in your pocket can put a spy in your pocket.
> 
> Dw
> 
> 
>