Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol

Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov> Sat, 09 June 2001 00:08 UTC

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Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2001 16:41:46 -0700
To: hansenw@ece.ubc.ca
From: Tony Bartoletti <azb@llnl.gov>
Subject: Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol
Cc: "Housley, Russ" <rhousley@rsasecurity.com>, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz, ietf-pkix@imc.org
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At 03:47 PM 6/8/01 -0700, Hansen Wang wrote:


> > A question:  If one discovers that they have accidently destroyed their
> > private key (and there is no evidence of compromise), are they under any
> > particular obligation to request revocation?  Is there any liability, or
> > other real "downside" to simply getting a new key and keeping mum about the
> > fate of the former key?
>
>Assuming that the entity which lost their private key wanted another
>certificate with a new key pair but wanted the same name. What would
>happen if their were two certificates in existance with the same name?
>Wouldn't the CA not allow this? Or request documentation/proof (maybe
>out-of-band methods) of ownership of the name and then the CA would
>revoke the previous certificate base on the out-of-band proof and issue
>a new one with the same name?
>
>Hansen Wang <hansenw@ece.ubc.ca>


I don't think so.  X.509 supports "key-implies-name".  You are suggesting 
that it also supports "name-implies-key".  I don't believe there is such a 
restriction in general (although a CA may decide per policy).

Is there some specific threat enabled if the key/name relation is many-to-one?

___tony___



Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <azb@llnl.gov>
Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, CA 94551-9900