Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol

pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) Fri, 08 June 2001 17:16 UTC

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From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
To: ietf-pkix@imc.org, madwolf@openca.org, nada@entegrity.com
Subject: Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol
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Nada Kapidzic Cicovic <nada@entegrity.com> writes:

>This is exactly what CMP specifies. Many vendors already have support for CMP
>EE initiated certificate revocation. The interoperability of different
>implementations of CMP certificate revocation (among other things) has been
>conducted during PKI Forum and ICSA CMP interop testing quite successfully.

However there are two ways to look at revocation, the DOS model and the scram
switch model.  The DOS model says that anyone who can revoke your cert can
cause a DOS, so it should be made as difficult as humanly possible to revoke a
cert.  The scram switch model says that when your private key is compromised
you want the cert revoked right now with no excuses, so it should be made as
easy as possible to revoke a cert.  CMP follows the DOS model and makes it very
difficult (in some cases impossible) to revoke your cert.  Programs like PGP
follow the scram switch model (via suicide-note revocations) and make it very
easy to revoke your cert.  Depending on your point of view, CMP may not be the
right thing for handling revocations.

Peter.