Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol

[jim <[e-mail]>]

If you want to disavow use of the key, the CA is responsible for making it happen
and the results of what happens if the keys do not get placed on a CRL.  Since
the CA is acting within the security arena, I would certainly hope that any CA
errs on the side of being too conservative.  However, that is up to the security
management protocol of the enterprise and I would not deem to tell an enterprise
how to operate.  From my perspective, if the CP and CPS would not require
disavowal of a key by a user via the process of certificate revocation, I would
prefer not to trust that enterprise.

So, I am not as concerned about a key not being revoked when its owner wants it
revoked as I am about it not being revoked when there is uncertainty about the
demise or destruction of the key.  Any uncertainty should be cause for revocation
just as a request from the user should be cause for revocation.

Jim

Tony Bartoletti wrote:

> At 07:42 AM 6/14/01 -0400, jim wrote:
>
> >I do not want to claim that a destroyed key is invalid.  What I believe
> >needs to happen is recognition that the CA is the one to make the decision
> >as to whether the key is destroyed, not the user.  If, for instance, I am
> >using a system with a hard token, if the key is run over by a car and will
> >not be usable, there is still the remains of the key to be turned over to
> >the CA and the CA can make the decision.  If the key is a software token,
> >there is no such manner of determining that the key is truly destroyed by
> >the average PKI user.  As such, why allow a user to determine whether the
> >key is destroyed?  All I think needs to happen is recognize that this is a
> >CA decision and let the CA take the appropriate precautions in accordance
> >with the CP/CPS for the system.
>
> All of this debate orbits around "who is on the hook" when bad things happen.
>
> If I suspect my key is compromised (but I cannot easily prove it), or I
> believe I have destroyed it (successfully or not), then what must I do to
> announce to the world that "any signatures generated after this point is
> time should not be attributed to me"?
>
> If it is only up to the CA to make these determinations, and the CA chooses
> not to agree, how am I to protect myself from responsibility for future
> transactions made in my name?
>
> If I make an effort to tell folks "this is the termination date of my key
> use", and the CA does not take action, do they (the CA) become responsible
> for any mischief that may ensue?  It would seem as if they must, since the
> decision on key reliability is in their hands.
>
> ___tony___
>
> Tony Bartoletti 925-422-3881 <[e-mail]>
> Information Operations, Warfare and Assurance Center
> Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
> Livermore, CA 94551-9900