RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol
Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com Tue, 12 June 2001 01:50 UTC
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Subject: RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol
To: Carlin Covey <ccovey@cylink.com>
Cc: ietf-pkix@imc.org
From: Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com
Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2001 19:04:14 -0700
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.... as per aside ... having somebody sign a document ... and then a notary validate the signature with the public key, and then the notary signs a composite document ... consisting of the originally signed document, the signer's public key, and the current time ... and then log it to a secure audit trail ..... could be done completely w/o the original signer's certificate .... since in effect, the notary can perform at least all the feature/function of a RA & CA as part of their function (in effect the composite document that the notary signs .... is a kind of certificate). It isn't absolutely necessary to know any validity period (from a certificate) of the original signer's public/private key .... it is just necessary that the notary validates the information as correct at the time it was signed/validated (and/or can be later shown to be valid at the time of the signing). .... have you noticed that the postings to the mailing list seems to have some sort of lag? I've yet to see my original reply to you made at 3:59 (MDT) ... 3 hrs later (presumably you answered the copy of the reply sent directly). "Carlin Covey" <ccovey@cylink.com> on 06/11/2001 04:42:12 PM To: Lynn Wheeler/CA/FDMS/FDC@FDC cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Lynn, I quite agree that notarizing, with or without secure time, is a more comprehensive solution. I simply proposed one-time signature keys as an example of a situation in which the certificate is expressly intended to be valid after the private key has been destroyed. Now whether anyone would want to use one-time signature keys is another matter .... Regards, Carlin ____________________________ - Carlin Covey Cylink Corporation -----Original Message----- From: Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com [mailto:Lynn.Wheeler@firstdata.com] Sent: Monday, June 11, 2001 3:59 PM To: Carlin Covey Cc: Bob Jueneman; ietf-pkix@imc.org Subject: RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol in many cases, notary can include the idea of (secure) time .... i.e. that not only can you proove who signed it ... but also when it was signed. in principle, private keys (whether compromised or not) should not be able to "pre-date" such a notorized, secure "time" signing. typical solution is either a secure audit trail .... and/or to encapsulate the signing inside some other transaction/document which includes a secure time which is then signed by the notary function. The notary function (wether audit trail or encapsulated function) can also include the business function of validating/prooving the original signature (aka the notary attests to the validity of a specific signature at a specific time). while a one-time key with non-expiring certificate could meet a subset of the business requirement .... it is not clear how many business processes would need just the subset w/o needing the rest of the capability (aka, a secure audit that establishes the validity of a signature executed at a specific time would subsume the need for a one-time signature key and also meet additional normal, day-to-day business requirements .... aka not only is there the issue of what order a sequence of signatures might have taken place .... but also what order did signatures take place within the context of real-world events and sequences ... i.e. time). If you are going to go to all the trouble of a notary ... dump the stuff with the one-time private key .... and meet the rest of the business requirements which includes did the signature verify and at what time did the signature verify. "Carlin Covey" <ccovey@cylink.com>@mail.imc.org on 06/11/2001 10:00:12 AM Sent by: owner-ietf-pkix@mail.imc.org To: "Bob Jueneman" <bjueneman@novell.com> cc: <ietf-pkix@imc.org> Subject: RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol [Bob Jueneman]: Indeed, although some have deprecated the concept of a private key validity period, it makes a great deal of sense to DELIBERATELY destroy a given signature key, especially a code or certificate signing key, well before the corresponding certificate expires. From the point of view of the certificate subscriber, this minimizes his risk by making certain that the key can NOT be compromised, yet the certificate has not expired or been revoked, so the certificate will continue to validate properly. [Carlin Covey]: I agree with Bob. It might even be desirable to use "one-time" signature keys for signing particularly important documents, such as major contracts, wills, etc. There might even be a "super non-repudiation" policy associated with the guaranteed destruction of the signature private key. This might be implemented via some trusted hardware token that generates the keypair, signs the document, destroys the private key, and signs a notification of private key destruction. Another possibility is some sort of trusted "key-destruction notary" service that notarizes the document, and then destroys the certified one-time signature key as a matter of policy. Regards, Carlin ____________________________ - Carlin Covey Cylink Corporation
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol JANES, Mark
- Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Hansen Wang
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Carlin Covey
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Williams
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Frank Balluffi
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Nada Kapidzic Cicovic
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Housley, Russ
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Andrew W. Gray
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Paul Hoffman / IMC
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Hansen Wang
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Marc Branchaud
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Paul Gogarty
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol jim
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Hansen Wang
- Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Mr Jonathan W Jenkyn
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Hansen Wang
- Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Paul Hoffman / IMC
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol jim
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Bob Jueneman
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Carlin Covey
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Marc Branchaud
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Marc Branchaud
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Marc Branchaud
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Lynn.Wheeler
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Marc Branchaud
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Carlin Covey
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Lynn.Wheeler
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Paul Gogarty
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Carlin Covey
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Bob Jueneman
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Terry Hayes
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Carlin Covey
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Lynn.Wheeler
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Massimiliano Pala
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol jim
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol jim
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Lynn.Wheeler
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Hal Lockhart
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol jim
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Liaquat Khan
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Scherling, Mark
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Santosh Chokhani
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Tony Bartoletti
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol jim
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Luis Azevedo
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Denis Pinkas
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Peter Gutmann
- RE: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Liaquat Khan
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Denis Pinkas
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Denis Pinkas
- Re: Online Certificate Revocation Protocol Nick Pope